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T he largest challenge for post-conflict societies which have been torn apart by ethnically motivated or justified violence is the creation of viable states and recreating social interaction. Anthony Oberschall in his article on ethnic 
cooperation and separation discusses these difficulties. He appears to be cautiously 
optimistic by arguing that although ethnic cooperation can be quickly destroying 
during war, it will grow back, albeit slowly, during peace time. At first, this might 
not appear all too encouraging, but the assumption that peace brings about a growth 
of cross-ethnic cooperation appears more optimistic than his empirical evidence 
suggests. In Miercurea Ciuc, according to Oberschall, the ethnic unmixing occurred 
without ethnic conflict. Similarly, segregation in Northern Ireland has to some de-
gree increased, or at least not decreased, after the signing of the Good Friday Peace 
Agreement in 1998.1 Similarly, reports about increased ethnic segregation in Mace-
donia since the Ohrid Framework Agreement suggest that peace does not necessar-
ily lead to an increase in ethnic cooperation.2
Anthony Oberschall argues accordingly that there are two forms of ethnic peace, 
one based on segregation and one based on cooperation. These two types should 
not be understood as a dichotomy from which one can be chosen by peacemakers. 
Division and segregation might already be in place after the conflict or might be 
part of the political dynamics. Thus, cooperation has to compete and coexist in with 
segregation. Cooperation is often about taking other lines of social and political ten-
sion seriously and reducing lines of division which would reinforce existing ethnic 
lines of division, as discussed in the case of religion by Oberschall. A key weakness 
of the peace-process in Bosnia (and elsewhere) has been the self-limitation of the 
international actors in undoing the segregation of the war, rather than creating new 
bridges between communities. Although I do not share the optimism of Oberschall 
regarding the integrative function of sport in Bosnia, especially considering the com-
mitment of most Bosnian Serb fans to the Serbian team, the integration of Bosnian 
football, at least institutionally, has been success story. There have been few efforts to 
create new forms of cooperation and communication, such as supporting the mobil-
ity across the entity boundary line (i.e. locating state institutions outside Sarajevo). 
The focus on undoing war-time segregation characterizes many other peace plans, 
successful or failed (i.e. Annan plan for Cyprus) and neglects new forms of coop-
eration. Furthermore, peace plans often neglect the stuff which defines the nature 
of interethnic relations in the future, in particular education. In Bosnia, education 
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was left out during the negotiations in Dayton, and only years later did the OSCE 
become active in promoting some basic cooperation. Oberschall is right in singling 
out this form of segregation. The “Two schools under one roof” scheme which cov-
ers some 50 schools in the Federation of Bosnia is a particularly stark form of seg-
regation, where Bosniak and Croat school pupils use different shifts and curricula 
and only share the building (often not even the rooms or floors). While some forms 
of ‘subversive’ contacts have emerged in these schools over time, the segregation 
has created a generation which has less experience of cross-ethnic communication 
that those who are old enough to have received their education in Yugoslavia. It is 
thus significant that post-conflict and nationalist educational system often contrib-
ute more to segregation than any other aspect of society. 
Institutional Responses
As Oberschall correctly notes, ethnic relations after a conflict are usually quiet 
different than before. Whereas the relevance of ethnic belonging might be marginal 
before and other political and socially relevant identities might have been competing 
(and even persevering) with ethnicity, after conflict ethnicity is often the prevalent 
form of political identity and characterized by fear and segregation. The fundamen-
tal challenge is the institutional response to this reality. While liberal scholars might 
be tempted to wish for a political system which is free of ethnicity and promotes 
individual rights, such a political system is often neither realistic nor desirable, as it 
might allow majorities to dominate and does not succeed in alleviating collectively 
mobilized fears. In his article, Oberschall distinguishes between incentive-based in-
stitutions and consociational systems, a distinction that reflects conventional wis-
dom on institutional responses to divided societies.5 Here, he argues that incentive-
based systems take a critical view of ethnicity and elites, while “Consociationalism 
institutionalizes and legitimizes ethnicity…and considers it desirable and benign.” 
While I share the concerns over the institutionalization of ethnicity, most scholars 
who support consociational approaches would not see ethnicity as benign or even 
desirable. Instead, ethnicity is a fact in post-conflict settings and divided societies 
more broadly. Thus, any institutional system needs to acknowledge this factor. As 
a result, I would agree with Brendan O’Leary’s assessment that consociationalists 
neither subscribe to a primordial understanding of, nor have an inherent preference 
for ethnic identity. Instead, the consociational approach assumes that ethnic identity, 
once mobilized is political relevant and its political salience is unlikely to decline 
rapidly. The problem of incentive-based systems which actively promote coopera-
tion is two-fold. Firstly, they run the risk of favoring the majority and consolidating 
the exclusion of smaller minorities. Secondly, ethnic elites are unlikely to agree to 
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undo the basis of their power. Thus, incentive based systems can only be successful 
if imposed from outside. This drastically reduces the opportunities for such systems 
and has made them rare around the world. 
The institutional choice is thus largely not between consociational and incen-
tive based systems, but rather over what kind of institutionalization of ethnicity is 
required and how such a system can acquire incentive-based elements over time. 
The example of Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly demonstrates that not any system 
which contains consociational features is adequate and the devil of a successful con-
sociational arrangement lies in the institutional details. What appears to be a weak-
ness of consociationalism is in fact a problem of the basic social consensus over the 
institutional set-up. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the veto rights and other 
ethnic representation is not at the roof of the difficult post-conflict reconstruction, 
but rather the lack of a foundational consensus over the state. Vetoes and ethnic 
quotas become a tool to sabotage the other’s institutions as they are not accepted by 
all parties. As the case of Northern Ireland highlights, consociational governance can 
work, as long as the agreement is accept by all main parties and no lingering issues 
prevent parties from investing into these institutions. 
Altogether, there is no easy answer on how to overcome the dominance and 
destructive power of ethnic identity after conflict. Clearly, ethnic belonging cannot 
be switched off with the recent memories of violence, elites which benefit from the 
issue and factual segregation. The key is a process which first takes out the fear fac-
tor from ethnic politics which empty identity from any meaning besides the fear 
of domination by others. Only when this occurs can ethnic belonging be a form of 
political identity which can coexist with other political ideas and open space for 
those who do not want to belong to an ethnic group or for whom belonging is not 
relevant. 
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